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Abstract— This paper presents the development of the method for accurate successful jamming rate calculation when MPSK modulated 
RCIED activation message is jammed using sweep signal. Opposite to classical methods of error modelling where it is taken that only 
one bit in a symbol may be altered, it is supposed in this paper that any number of bits in a symbol is the subject of eventual 
modification. The derived formulas are achieved for QPSK, 8PSK and 16PSK modulated signals jamming. The results calculated by 
these formulas are verified and obtained by our originally developed simulation method. The results of calculation and simulation agree 
very well and the maximum difference between calculated and simulated successful jamming rate for any of three analyzed jamming 
methods and any level ratio between activation message signal and jamming signal does not overcome 1.1%. It is proved that successful 
jamming rate tends to maximum value 0.5 when jamming signal power increases and that only 20% lower successful jamming rate 
value is obtained for less than 7dB higher jamming signal level than it is the level of RCIED activation signal. These results point out 
that it is not necessary to apply too high emission power to achieve acceptable jamming effect. As a consequence, jammer practical 
implementation is easier and its dimensions are smaller. 
Keywords- sweep jamming; successful jamming rate; RCIED activation signal; jamming power; simulation method. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Remote controlled improvised explosive devices (RCIEDs) 
become the great threat nowadays not only in war regions, but 
also in areas with normal everyday life. It is fascinating how 
relatively simple devices, realized by simple and cheap 
modifications of equipment, which may be found in the 
nearest, free shop, convert to dangerous weapon. Available 
devices for modifications to RCIEDs and their operation 
techniques are numerous and they are mutually very different 
one from the other. That’s why the fight against such devices is 
very complicated and why the implemented jammers against 
RCIED activation are several times more expensive than the 
RCIED. As RCIED activation techniques are numerous, there 
is also a great variety of methods for fight against these hostile 
activities. Roughly speaking, there are two main types of 
jamming: active jamming and responsive jamming. The 
characteristic of the first one is that jamming signal is 
generated practically constantly, regardless of RCIED 
activation signal existence. When the second type of jamming 
is applied, jamming signal is generated only upon RCIED 
activation signal detection. Although in the first moment it may 
be concluded that active jamming is more reliable, it is proved 
in [2] that responsive jamming may be often more reliable. 
Among the methods of active jamming, sweep jamming is 
probably the most popular one. It may be implemented 
independently or together with other jamming methods [3] - 
[7]. Application of sweep jamming is wider than just for 
RCIED activation jamming. It may be used for jamming hostile 
voice and data communications [8], [9] or for jamming 
communications over mobile telephony systems [10]-[12]. 
Although implemented in such great variety of jamming 
systems, the parameters of sweep jamming are rarely analyzed 
theoretically [13], [14]. Among these parameters, the authors 
haven’t found the contribution dealing with the exact 
calculation of Successful Jamming Rate (SJR) (or, in other 
words, Bit Error Rate (BER)) for sweep jamming of MPSK 
modulated RCIED activation message signals. In the 
contribution [15] it was introduced the variable jamming rate 
(JR) as the relation of time interval when jamming signal 
generation to the total elapsed time. Here SJR is defined in the 
sense of BER [1] to better define this variable according to its 
real application. The results available in literature, intended to 
determine BER when MPSK signal is transmitted, are obtained 
for the situations when jamming signal level is lower than 
MPSK modulated signal level. In such a case the value of BER 
is relatively low. This is not applicable when jamming is 
realized. For successful jamming realization it is necessary that 
jamming signal level is (significantly) higher than RCIED 
activation message signal. We haven’t found the analysis for 
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such signals relation. 
II. SJR CALCULATION FOR SWEEP JAMMING OF MPSK 
MODULATED SIGNAL 
The calculation of BER for various PSK modulated signal 
types (MPSK) is based on phasor analysis in the area of 
constellation diagram, which corresponds to the applied PSK 
modulation. Vectors in the phasor diagram represent RCIED 
activation signal and sweep jamming signal at the moment 
when the frequency of jamming signal is equal (or 
approximately equal) to the frequency of activation signal. 
Fig. 1 is an illustration of the phasor diagram of activation 
signal (A) and sweep jamming signal (B). This phasor diagram 
is presented together with the constellation diagram of MPSK 
modulated signal. The diagram is shown for M=16, i.e. for 
16PSK modulation, but the conclusions are general. When 
jamming of RCIED activation messages is considered, the 
main interest is focused on the amplitude ratio B>A and such a 
case is analyzed in this paper and presented in Fig. 1. 
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Figure 1.  Phasor and constellation diagram for sweep jamming of 16PSK 
modulated activation message 
The activation message vector is placed in the area of angle 
SOT in the constellation diagram.  The value of this angle is 
2∙π/M, which is also equal to the value of all other angles in the 
constellation diagram corresponding to different coding 
combinations of MPSK signal. The borders between areas 
dedicated to different coding combinations are presented by 
dashed lines in Fig. 1. 
The phase ratio between signals A and B may be arbitrary, 
meaning that the angle between A and B in Fig. 1 is anyone 
between 0 and 2∙π. As it is B>A, the resultant vector may be in 
any of M areas of the constellation diagram. The calculation for 
two semicircles from Fig. 1 is equal, so it is enough to perform 
the calculation for one semicircle, i.e. for the area between 0 
and π. 
Let us consider the sweep jamming signal phase 
corresponding to some arbitrary area j (j=1,...,M/2) between 
vectors QC1 and QC2. In this case the resultant vector of 
vectors A and B is in the area of the angle C1OC2, which is 
equal to 2∙π/M. The lines QQ1 and QQ2 are pulled to form 
rectangular triangles QQ1C1 and QQ2C2. As a consequence, the 
angle Q1QQ2 is also equal to 2∙π/M. The angle C1QC2 may be 
now calculated from 
2
arc cos arc cos
M
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The values of QQ1 and QQ2 may be calculated from 
rectangular triangles OQQ1 and OQQ2. In these triangles the 
values of angles are 
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Starting from the angles, determined by (2), the angle 
C1QC2 in (1) is 
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This calculation procedure may be implemented for all 
coding areas except the last one which corresponds to the angle 
C3QO1. For this area, it is 
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where the angle OQQ3 is determined from the rectangular 
triangle OQQ3 whose angle QOQ3 is equal to π/M. 
The probability Parj that resultant vector end is in some area 
j of constellation diagram, whose value is determined by (3) or 
(4), is obtained by dividing this value by π. Now SJR may be 
calculated as: 
M/2
mj
arj
j=1 2
f
SJR = P
log M
 ,   (5) 
where fmj is the mean number of faulty bits in a symbol when 
resultant vector end after sweep jamming is in the area j distant 
in relation to the activation message signal vector. The value of 
fmj may be determined as 
M/2
jl
mj
jl=1
2 f
f
M

=  ,          (6) 
where fjl is the number of faulty bits when the activation 
message signal vector is in some area l and the resultant vector 
is in the area j distant in relation to the activation message 
signal vector. For each combination of indices j and l there are 
two areas at distance j from the area l, one in clockwise 
direction and the other in counter clockwise direction from the 
  
International Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computing  
Vol. 3, No. 2 (2019) 
 
39 
 
area l. Therefore, each fjl value is the mean value of the values 
determined for these two areas. 
III. PARAMETER DETERMINATION FOR VARIOUS 
MODULATION TECHNIQUES 
Our goal is to calculate exact probability of successful 
sweep jamming in the case that RCIED activation message is 
transmitted by QPSK, 8PSK and 16PSK modulated signal. The 
calculation is performed using (5) and (6). The values of Parj in 
these equations are determined by (3) and (4). The values of M 
for the derived formulas are 4 for QPSK, 8 for 8PSK and 16 for 
16PSK. 
A. Analysis for QPSK 
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Figure 2.  Phasor and constellation diagram for QPSK modulated signal 
sweep jamming with number of bit errors in each coding area 
Fig. 2 presents phasor and constellation diagram for QPSK 
modulated RCIED activation message sweep jamming. The 
coded bit combination of QPSK modulated signal is 00 and the 
vector A of this signal is in the area designated as “area 0”. The 
coded combinations in areas at distance j=1 are 01 (“area 1” in 
counter clockwise direction) and 10 (“area 1” in clockwise 
direction). This means that there is one faulty bit (designation 
“1 err.” in Fig. 2) of total two bits in coded combination if the 
resultant vector after jamming falls in one of these areas. 
Therefore, we can write fjl=1 in this case. “Area 2” is area at 
distance j=2. As the coded combination in this area is 11, both 
bits are faulty if the resultant vector falls in this area (“2 err.”). 
This means that now it is fjl=2. 
B. Analysis for 8PSK 
Fig. 3 presents phasor and constellation diagram for 8PSK 
modulated RCIED activation message sweep jamming. Coding 
combination 000 is transmitted in the activation message. As 
for QPSK signal, the distance j from the “area 0” is presented 
as the number besides the designation “area”, as well as the 
number of faulty bits if the resultant vector falls in that area. 
The number of faulty bits in the areas with the same j in the 
clockwise and counter clockwise direction is not always the 
same. In the counter clockwise direction the coded bits 
combination in the “area 3” is 010, meaning that one of three 
bits forming the symbol is faulty. The coded bits combination 
in the “area 3” in clockwise direction is 111. Therefore, now all 
3 bits of the symbol are faulty. That’s why designation in this 
area is “3 err.”. The mean number of faulty bits after the 
consideration of two available areas at distance j=3 is 2. 
As for the case of coding bits combination 000 in RCIED 
activation message, the similar analysis may be performed for 
all other bits combinations of the activation message. For all 
these combinations the number of faulty bits in adjacent areas 
with j=1 is fjl=1 and for j>1 it is fjl=2. That’s why the same 
values are obtained also for fmj. The obtained values of fjl and 
fmj are summarized in Table I. 
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Figure 3.  Phasor and constellation diagram for 8PSK modulated signal 
sweep jamming with number of bit errors in each coding area 
TABLE I.  THE VALUES OF FJL AND FMJ FOR 8PSK MODULATION 
code Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 Area 4 
000 1 2 2 2 
001 1 2 2 2 
011 1 2 2 2 
010 1 2 2 2 
110 1 2 2 2 
111 1 2 2 2 
101 1 2 2 2 
100 1 2 2 2 
fmj 1 2 2 2 
C. Analysis for 16PSK 
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Figure 4.  Phasor and constellation diagram for 16PSK modulated signal 
sweep jamming with number of bit errors in each coding area 
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Fig. 4 presents phasor and constellation diagram for 16PSK 
modulated RCIED activation message sweep jamming. Data 
necessary for the analysis are presented in the relation to the 
coded bits combination 0000. The values of fjl are not the same 
for one value of j when analysis is started from different coded 
bits combinations in the activation message, i.e. from the areas 
with different l. This is illustrated in Table II. 
TABLE II.  THE VALUES OF FJL AND FMJ FOR 16PSK MODULATION 
code Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 Area 4 Area 5 Area 6 Area 7 Area 8 
0000 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 
0001 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 
0011 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 
0010 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 
0110 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 
0111 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 
0101 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 
0100 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 
1100 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 
1101 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 
1111 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 
1110 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 
1010 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 
1011 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 
1001 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 
1000 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 
fmj 1 2 2 2 2.5 3 2.5 2 
 
IV. THE SIMULATION PROGRAM 
The main goal in this paper is the calculation of the exact 
value of the successful sweep jamming probability. The 
developed calculation method is applicable to the case when 
only one type of jamming (sweep) signal is generated in one 
time interval. But, one direction of IRITEL future 
development is towards simultaneous generation of two 
different jamming signals in the same frequency band and 
even in one of its subbands. It is necessary to predict effects of 
such jamming before implementing it. In IRITEL solution of 
jammer [16] there is a possibility to generate sweep and 
barrage jamming signal in the same time according to the 
user’s request. This scenario is applicable only for one part of 
the complete frequency spectrum, but the main intention is to 
generate these signals in different subbands. For the case of 
signals generation in the same subband it is difficult to 
develop an analytical model. There exist the results in 
literature where system performances are analyzed in the 
presence of two types of interfering signals [17] [18]. If we 
would like to implement the results from these references, we 
may consider that RCIED activation signal is the regular 
signal and that sinusoidal jamming signal is interference 
signal. The graphs in [17] [18] are presented also as a function 
of signal to noise ratio.  At a glance it is just what we need. 
However, the analyzed situation in [17] [18] is quite different 
than our one. In [17] [18] regular signal is the desired signal 
and the levels of interference signal and noise are lower than 
the level of regular signal (the results are limited to the 
amplitude ratio A/B≥5dB, i.e. A/B≥1.8). When jamming is 
analyzed, both sweep and barrage jamming signal usually 
have higher level than RCIED activation signal and the results 
from these references may not be applied. That’s why the 
results on the base of [17], [18] are only an estimation. 
The problems in the development of an analytical model in 
this case may be overcome by the implementation of 
simulation program. The program is an original IRITEL 
contribution and in the first step presented in this paper the 
goal was to verify possibility that such a program gives 
satisfactory results. In other words, the goal was to prove that 
the results of calculation method and simulation program are 
mutually comparable in a simpler situation of only sweep 
jamming application. 
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Figure 5.  Flow-chart of the simulation program 
The flow-chart of the developed simulation program is 
presented in Fig. 5. The simulation is performed for different 
values of jamming signal level (B) relative to RCIED 
activation signal level (block 1 in Fig. 5) and for all predicted 
code combinations (CC) (block 3). For each such defined 
combination of B and CC jamming signal starting phase 
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relative to RCIED activation signal phase is determined on the 
base of uniformly distributed random number (RN) (block 4). 
The next step in simulation program (block 5) is the 
calculation of the phase of aggregate signal (φΣ) composed as 
the vector sum of CC signal (the phase of this signal is φCC) 
and jamming signal, whose phase φ is previously determined 
in the block 4. The calculation is performed applying the 
equation: 
B
B
 

 

+ 
=
+ 
CC
CC
sin sin
arctang
cos cos
    (7) 
The value of φΣ is then used to determine the number of 
incorrectly received bits (EB) in a MPSK symbol based on the 
data presented in Tables I or II in dependence on the applied 
MPSK signal modulation level. 
During the whole simulation process the number of 
incorrectly received bits is accumulated (the register EBΣ 
initiated in the block 2 is incremented in each program loop 
pass in the block 6). 
The number of repeated program loop passes is determined 
in blocks 7, 8 and 10. First of all, the simulation is performed 
for 25 different jamming signal levels. That’s why the value 
max B in the block 10 is 25. Then, the situation is analyzed for 
every of M=16 possible code combinations (CC) as 16PSK 
modulation is considered. This is the reason why it is max 
CC=16 in the block 8. And, finally, the number of randomly 
generated jamming signal phases relative to CC signal phase is 
1.000.000 leading to the value max JS = 1.000.000 in the block 
7. The simulation is realized in our originally developed C 
program using the commercial PC. The simulation for such 
initial parameters lasts less than 8 minutes. 
The values of successful jamming rate (SJR) are 
determined in the block 9 of the simulation program. This is 
the output value of the simulation program and it is 
determined as: 
Σ
2
EB
SJR
log M CC JS
=
 max max
  (8) 
V. THE ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Fig. 6 presents SJR values as the function of amplitudes ratio 
A/B for QPSK modulated activation signal. The graph is 
designated as SJR_QPSK_calculation in Fig. 6. The results are 
calculated using formulas (3) to (6), which are intended for 
A/B<1. As a comparison, the graph with the designation 
SJR_QPSK_simulation presents the same characteristic 
obtained by simulation. Simulation is realized according to the 
flow-chart presented in Fig. 5. The results obtained by 
calculation and by simulation in this case are nearly completely 
the same. 
Fig. 7 presents SJR values as the function of amplitudes ratio 
A/B for 8PSK modulated activation signal. The graph is 
designated as SJR_8PSK_calculation in Fig. 7. As a 
comparison, the graph with the designation 
SJR_8PSK_simulation presents the same characteristic 
obtained by simulation. The results obtained by calculation and 
by simulation in this case are also nearly completely the same.      
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Figure 6.  SJR as a function of the relation of amplitudes A/B for QPSK 
modulated signal determined by calculation and simulation  
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Figure 7.  SJR as a function of the relation of amplitudes A/B for 8PSK 
modulated signal determined by calculation and simulation 
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Figure 8.  SJR as a function of the relation of amplitudes A/B for 16PSK 
modulated signal determined by calculation and simulation 
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Figure 9.  SJR as a function of the relation of amplitudes A/B for QPSK, 
8PSK and 16PSK modulated RCIED activation message sweep jamming 
 
Fig. 8 presents comparatively the values of SJR obtained by 
calculation (the characteristic SJR_16PSK_calculation) and 
simulation (the characteristic SJR_16PSK_simulation) for 
jamming 16PSK signal. For the range of RCIED activation 
signal and jamming signal amplitudes between 0dB and -25dB 
the difference between SJR values obtained by calculation and 
simulation is maximum 1.1%, thus well approving the 
reliability of simulation process and nominating it for the 
analysis of more complicated implementation scenarios. 
The results presented in [19] are approximate values of 
SJR. These approximate values of SJR are always lower than 
exact values determined in this paper. The emphasized trend in 
approximation occurs because each symbol error is treated as 
only one bit in a symbol is erroneous, i.e. that the resultant 
signal vector is always in the adjacent area to the regular signal 
area if error happens. The probability that the number of 
erroneous bits in a symbol is higher than 1 increases when the 
relative amplitudes ratio A/B decreases (i.e. when jamming 
signal level increases). This is the reason why the difference 
between approximate and exact SJR characteristic increases 
when jamming signal level increases. When considering 
systems usually analyzed in literature (as, for example, in [17] 
[18]), we may say that interference, i.e. jamming signal level is 
significantly lower than regular signal, causing that very rarely 
more than one bit in a symbol is erroneous. In such a case 
approximate calculation gives satisfactory results (approximate 
method is nearly accurate), but for our needs where jamming 
signal level is higher than RCIED activation signal level, it is 
much better to implement exact method.        
Fig. 9 presents together exact values of SJR for sweep 
jamming of QPSK, 8PSK and 16PSK modulated activation 
message signals. This figure shows that for all applied 
modulation techniques SJR values tend to 0.5 when the ratio of 
amplitudes A/B decreases. This important conclusion was not 
possible on the base of the results from [19]. The emphasized 
result is also implemented in the example in [15], where it is 
supposed that it is SJR=0.5 when jamming of GSM mobile 
systems is analyzed. The presented graphs in Fig. 9 also show 
that the higher values of SJR are achieved with the increase of 
M. This means that it is easier to realize successful jamming of 
16PSK modulated RCIED activation message than 8PSK and 
QPSK modulated messages. 
The graphs from Fig. 9 prove that it is not important to 
increase sweep jamming signal level over some value. The 
value SJR=0.4, which is only 20% lower than the maximum 
theoretically achievable SJR value, may be reached for the 
amplitude ratio A/B=-1dB when jamming 16PSK modulated 
activation message and for A/B=-7dB when jamming QPSK 
modulated activation message. This analysis enabled us to 
significantly decrease jamming signal emission power in our 
new jammer solution [16], [20] comparing to the emission 
power of the previous solution [21]. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we developed the method for calculation of 
the exact values of SJR when sweep jamming of MPSK 
modulated RCIED activation messages is performed. The 
method is intended for the analysis in the case when jamming 
signal amplitude B is higher than activation message amplitude 
A (B>A). The specificity of such an analysis is that more than 
one bit in a symbol may be incorrectly transmitted. For an 
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exact SJR calculation it is more complicated than if only one 
bit in a symbol may be erroneous, as it is for A>B.  
The results from this paper may be used for quantitative 
estimation of necessary jammer characteristics. Besides the 
knowledge of these sweep jamming characteristics, it is 
important to have a good prediction of techniques and devices, 
which are expected to be implemented for RCIED activation in 
the region, where jamming is realized [22], [23]. When the 
techniques of usual attack are well known, it is possible to 
adjust the level of jamming signal. Possible decrease of 
jamming signal level without significant degradation of jammer 
performances leads to emission power saving and lowers the 
detection probability of our jammer position [24]. In addition, 
jamming device dimensions could be reduced. 
One additional paper contribution is a new simulation 
method for jamming performance analysis. Simulation method 
is especially important for the more complicated situations, as 
for the case when different jamming signal types are 
implemented in the same time. Such an analysis will be the 
subject of our future development. In this paper we limited 
ourselves to the simulation method verification in the case of 
pure sweep jamming. The calculation and simulation results are 
nearly quite the same in the case of QPSK and 8PSK 
modulated RCIED activation signal jamming, while for 16PSK 
modulated signal there is a low difference (about 1% 
maximum) in probabilities of SJR obtained by calculation and 
simulation.  
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